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  Much of the existing auction literature treats auctions as running independently of one another, 
with each bidder choosing to participate in only one auction.  However, in many online auctions, a 
number of substitutable goods are auctioned concurrently and bidders can bid on several auctions at 
the same time.  Recent theoretical research shows how bidders can gain from the existence of 
competing auctions, the current paper providing the first empirical evidence in support of competing 
auctions theory using online auctions data from eBay.  Our results indicate that a significant 
proportion of bidders do bid across competing auctions and that bidders tend to submit bids on 
auctions with the lowest standing bid, as the theory predicts.  The paper also shows that winning 
bidders who cross-bid pay lower prices on average than winning bidders who do not.  
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1  Introduction 
In standard auction theory, the typical assumption is that there is a single seller and 
several bidders, with the seller acting as a monopoly and capturing all the information rents.  
In practice, sellers often do not have monopoly power but rather have to compete against 
other sellers, giving buyers the opportunity to choose among many auctions.  This is 
especially common in online auctions.  
The best known online auction site, eBay, has evolved to act as a clearinghouse for 
the sale of a large number of homogeneous goods.  At any given time, a number of virtually 
identical items are available for sale - on the afternoon of February 12, 2004, for example, the 
search item ‘Windows XP Home Edition’ turned up 196 active auctions for this software.  
Further, the cost associated with bidding is very low and bidders can easily monitor several 
online auctions concurrently.  Thus it is possible for bidders to bid across several competing 
auctions at roughly the same time. 
A handful of papers in the literature consider the case in which sellers compete 
against each other (see for instance McAfee (1993) and Peters and Severinov (1997)).
1  These 
papers assume that bidders can only choose to buy from one seller, and the only equilibrium 
involves bidders randomizing over available sellers.  In this case, it is entirely possible that 
some auctions should have many bidders while other auctions have few or no bidders, and 
consequently that some profitable trades may not be realized.  Several recent papers provide 
empirical analyses of the online auction market, surveyed by Bajari and Hortacsu (2004) in 
their comprehensive review of the empirical literature.
2  It is worth noting that all the papers 
in this rapidly growing empirical literature treat online auctions as independent of one 
another. 
The empirical analysis in this paper is prompted by recent theoretical work by Peters 
and Severinov (2002) on bidding behavior in competing auctions, in which they consider 
market equilibrium involving competing auctions similar to those used in eBay.  When there 
is no bidding cost and no fixed ending time for auctions, Peters and Severinov demonstrate 
                                                 
1 Recently, in a paper entitled “Competing Auctions,”  Ellison et al. consider competition among different online 
auction sites (markets), focusing on the coexistence of these markets rather than competition among auctions 
themselves.  
2 Topics addressed include late bidding (see  Roth and Ockenfels (2002), Ockenfels and Roth (2004) and 
Schindler (2003)), the winner’s curse (Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) and Yin (2003)), reputation mechanisms (Ba 
and Pavlou (2002), Cabral and Hortacsu (2003), and Resnick et al. (2003)), and the choice of different trading 
mechanisms (see Lucking-Reiley (1999) and Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2003)).      
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that the strategy in which bidders always submit a bid on an auction with the lowest 
‘standing’ bid and then bid with the minimum increment is a (weak) perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium.  This implies that bidders should bid across competing auctions and if a bidder 
becomes the highest bidder, he/she should pause bidding until other bidders outbid him/her.  
It is interesting to note that bidding o nce and bidding one’s true valuation is not an 
equilibrium in this environment; intuitively, if bidders bid their true valuations and bid only 
once, they may be trapped into paying a higher price than is necessary and therefore may not 
have an opportunity to switch to other less competitive auctions.
3  For competing auctions, 
the final price of one auction is affected by the existence of other auctions.  Furthermore, 
prices will tend to be uniform across competing auctions.  
In the current paper, we examine whether or not the behavior of bidders in competing 
auctions corresponds to the strategy prescribed by Peters and Severinov (2002) using data 
from competing auctions in eBay.
4  In particular, we examine the impact of auction 
substitutability on bidding behavior, assessing whether agents do indeed bid across 
competing auctions (“cross-bid”).  We also examine whether cross-bidding results in bidders 
paying lower prices for the objects they bid for.  
The results presented in this study are based on a unique d ataset collected from 
competing auctions for CPU’s that took place on eBay over several months.  We consider 
auctions with almost the same ending time and involving the sale of identical or very similar 
items. To ensure homogeneity among these items, we restrict attention to groups of auctions 
that share the same seller, and which have the same description, the same starting price and 
delivery method, and ending at almost the same time.  From the data, we generate three 
competing auction samples: competing auctions ending on the same day, competing auctions 
ending within an hour, and competing auctions with ending times within a minute of each 
                                                 
3 Consider a situation that i nvolves two competing auctions and four bidders.  Suppose that the sellers’ 
valuations are $0, and bidders’ valuations respectively are $10, $9, $5, and $4.  If all bidders choose only one 
auction and bid their true valuation then the two highest valuation bidders may end-up bidding at the same 
auction, the winner paying a price of $9.  The bidder with valuation of $5 will win the auction. If bidders bid 
across competing auctions and bid with minimum increment then the two highest valuation bidders would win 
these two auctions and pay lower prices.  
4 Other auction markets also sell many similar items but use mechanisms different from that in eBay.   
Sotheby’s and Christie’s sell many identical items, such as wine, in one auction. These identical items are sold 
sequentially, lot by lot. Telecommunication spectrum auctions make all lots available for bidding at the same 
time. The auctions take place over a number of rounds, until no further bidding takes place on all lots being 
offered. The bidding strategies appropriate for these kinds of auctions are completely different from those in 
eBay environment we study.      
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other.  This allows us to investigate the effect of increasing the degree of substitutability 
among auctions on the behavior of auction participants. 
Our results provide first compelling empirical evidence in support of competing 
auctions theory.  We find clear evidence that a high proportion of bidders do cross-bid.  
Further, bidders tend to bid on the auction with the lowest standing bid, in conformity with 
the strategy proposed by Peters and Severinov.  In terms of substitutability, we find that as 
the difference in the ending time across auctions becomes smaller, so more bidders tend to 
bid across competing auctions.  In order to assess the potential gains from following the 
Peters and Severinov bidding strategy, we compare the winning price paid by bidders who 
bid across competing auctions with those who do not.  We find that on average, winning 
bidders who actively bid across competing auctions pay around 91 percent of the price paid 
by those winning bidders who do not cross-bid.
5   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional 
features of eBay, and the construction of the dataset we use is discussed in Section 3.  Section 
4 provides evidence on bidding behavior in competing eBay auctions.  In Section 5, we 
compare the average price paid by bidders who cross-bid versus bidders who do not, and 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
2  Institutional Features of eBay Auctions 
As the most extensively studied online market, eBay provides a rich resource for the 
study of auctions in general and, because a large number of very similar (if not identical) 
items are auctioned at any given time, it also provides an excellent opportunity to study 
competing auctions in particular.  
eBay is an e-commerce website which provides a central market for buyers and sellers 
to trade using auctions.  Sellers pay a fee whereas bidders pay no fee, and sellers also choose 
an auction type for the sale of their goods.  (In this paper, we only consider auctions that use 
eBay’s standard online auction format.
6)  They set a starting bid, a minimum bid increment 
and specify the duration of the auction.  Sellers provide a detailed description of the item, 
                                                 
5 At the time the data were collected, Intel Pentium III 933 MHz CPUs sold for around US$100. Thus cross-
bidding could lead to a $9 discount on average, which is non-trivial. 
6 eBay conducts a variety of other types of auction, including reserve price auctions, Buy It Now, Fixed Price, 
New eBay Store Buy It Now Listings, private auctions, Dutch auctions, and restricted-access auctions.  See 
http://pages.ebay.com/help/sellerguide/selling-type.html.      
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which usually includes the method of delivery and method of payment, and they also have the 
option to set a secret reserve price.  If they do, during the auction process eBay indicates 
whether the reserve price has been met or not, and if the reserve price has not been met at the 
end of the auction, sellers have the option of not selling the item. 
The mechanism used by eBay resembles a second-price auction. At any time, eBay 
shows the current standing bid of the auction, which is the current second highest bid; in the 
special cases where there is no bid or only one bid, the current standing bid is the starting bid.  
When a bidder submits a bid, he/she knows the current standing bid, the identity of the seller 
(along with the seller’s  “feedback value” discussed below), the starting and ending time of 
the auction and a description of the item.  The bidder also knows how many bids have already 
been submitted, the identity of the bidders and the times each of the bids were made.  
However, the exact amount of each bid is not revealed until the end of the auction.  The final 
price is the second highest bid plus a specified minimum increment. 
eBay plays no role in the actual exchange of items at the end of the auction.  The 
winning bidders and sellers contact each other directly to complete the transaction. Since 
bidders cannot inspect the goods, sellers have incentive to provide false information, and the 
winning bidders may not want to pay and complete the transaction.  In order to facilitate the 
completion of transactions and to boost the confidence of potential market players, eBay uses 
a feedback system. After each transaction (whether successful or not), the seller and the 
winning bidder can send feedback about the other party to eBay, marked as positive, neutral 
and negative, with values of  +1, 0, -1 respectively, along with brief comments. Each trader is 
allocated a feedback number, which is the sum of his or her feedback values. The feedback 
information is public and always associated with the trader, though this system is far from 
foolproof, as eBay cannot prevent traders, particularly those with a bad reputation, from 
changing identities. (See Bajari and Hortacsu (2004) for a survey of empirical analyses of the 
reputation mechanism in eBay.) 
When an auction ends, eBay provides detailed information about the associated bid 
history.
7 An example of the history of one auction extracted from eBay’s website is presented 
in Appendix 1.  The top half of the Appendix reports basic information about the auction.  It 
was a three-day auction, which started on October 31, 2001 at 22:51:27 PST and ended on 
                                                 
7 Before the middle of 2000, eBay provided only the highest bid of a bidder and his/her last bidding time. After 
that date, more detailed bidding histories are provided, as used in this study.       
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November 3, 2001 at 22:51:27 PST.  The seller’s feedback value was 11.  The starting bid set 
by the seller was $10 and the minimum bid increment, $0.50. The auction received 10 bids 
from 4 different bidders. The cost of shipping was $5 and the optional shipping insurance 
cost, $5. 
The lower half of the figure shows the detailed bidding history, sorted by the amount 
of each bid. The auction received its first bid of $17.50 by “planetorb” around 23 hours after 
the start of the auction. Then 4 hours before the end of the auction, bidder “raheem112” 
started to bid. This bidder would have realized that he/she was not the only bidder though 
would not have known the exact amount of the other bid.  Since there was only one bidder at 
that time, the standing bid was still $10. Bidder “raheem112” first placed a bid of $11 and 
found that the standing bid increased to $11, indicating that he/she was not the highest bidder. 
“raheem112” then increased his/her bid subsequently in 2 minutes to $13, $14, then $15, until 
at last he/she became the highest bidder with a bid of $20. The standing bid then became 
$17.50. In the last hour of the auction, the bidder “iteachcomputers” submitted a bid of $20, 
increasing the standing bid to $20. Bidder “raheem112” increased his/her bid to $21 followed 
by another bidder who bid $23.99. Bidder “planetorb” finally won the auction with an 
unknown bid. Since the minimum increment is $0.50, the final price was $24.49 (the second 
highest bid $23.99 plus the bid increment $0.50). There was no bid retraction or cancellation 
for this auction. Similar information on completed eBay auctions is available to the public for 
one month following the end of the auction. 
 
3  Data 
Our sample consists of CPU auctions that took place on eBay during the period 
January 26, 2002 to May 18, 2002.  As a first step towards data collection, we entered “CPU” 
as the key word on eBay’s search page for completed auctions.
8  The search results showed 
CPU related auctions completed for up to 15 days prior to the day the search was conducted.  
A Java program was then used to download links to the history of each item, in turn used to 
download the bid history and other relevant information.  This generated data on all kinds of 
                                                 
8 The option to search for completed auctions is no longer available from eBay, as of February, 2004.      
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CPUs and CPU-related items, from more than 71,000 auctions in total.  The sample was 
further refined by selecting only those auctions that involved the sale of a single item.
9 
Our full sample consists of 41,849 auctions.  Of these, 7,333 auctions did not attract 
any bids and 2,624 auctions had a secret reserve price, the secret price being met in only 
1,533 auctions. We also observed some auctions with non-serious sellers.
10  In the full sample, 
the average final price is $60.91, with standard deviation $90.93.  The wide variation in price 
is largely due to the existence of many different models and items in different conditions.  
However, even for identical items sold at almost the same time (such as i tems in the same 
competing auctions group), we still observe significant price variation.
11  The mean of the 
starting bids was $25.17 with standard deviation $69.85. On average, each auction attracted 
7.13 bids (with standard deviation 7.14). Variation in the number of bids can be explained in 
part by variation in the starting bid - the higher the starting bid, the lower the number of 
bidders and subsequent bids. 
Competing auctions in our sample satisfy the following conditions: first, the items 
auctioned are reasonably homogeneous in quality (including warranty provisions) and have 
similar delivery methods and shipping costs, second, the auctions end at approximately the 
same time.  Although the conditions of properly working CPUs and related products in a 
specific category (such as Pentium III 800 retail boxes) are largely the same, they may still 
differ in other respects.  For example, some may be new and the box may not have been 
opened, while others may have been used for several months, some CPUs may have been 
under warranty, and the method of delivery, the shipping cost and the method of payment 
may also differ. 
To overcome complications associated with this heterogeneity, we focus on a sub-
sample consisting of groups of auctions with very similar features.  In particular, we choose 
auctions run by the same sellers, selling items with the same product descriptions, the same 
delivery method and the same shipping cost, using the fact that some sellers on eBay sell a 
number of almost identical items.  Except for different ending times, these auctions are 
completely indistinguishable to bidders.  Because we focus on auctions with the same seller, 
                                                 
9 Items sold using Buy It Now are also excluded from the sample.  
10 For example, one seller set a starting bid of US$999 for a single CPU.  Unsurprisingly, no one bid on this item. 
11 This fact is documented and analyzed in Zheng (2002).  It may be explained by random matching of bidders 
and sellers.  Cross-bidding can reduce price variation to some extent.      
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we are likely to understate the true extent of cross-bidding.  Even so, we will find clear 
evidence of cross-bidding using this more conservative sample in Section 4 below.
12   
The starting and ending times of auctions included in our sample are not the same.  
Auctions that end at approximately the same time compete more directly against each other 
than those with sizeable differences in ending times.  From the CPU auctions sample, we 
obtain three samples of competing auctions.
13 Each observation in these samples is a group of 
auctions that consist of 2 or more competing auctions. The first sample (the daily sample) 
includes groups of competing auctions ending within the same day.  The second sample (the 
hourly sample) includes groups of competing auctions ending within one hour of each other.  
The third sample (the minute sample) includes groups of competing auctions ending within 
one minute of each other.  Auctions appearing in the minute sample also appear in the hourly 
sample and those appearing in the hourly sample also appear in the daily sample. 
Table 1 provides a description of the three samples.  We consider only those groups of 
competing auctions in which at least one auction receives a positive number of bids.  The 
minute sample has the smallest size, consisting 328 groups of competing auctions. The hourly 
and daily samples consist of 1021 and 1943 groups of competing auctions respectively. 
However, the average number of auctions per group for the three samples is not very different. 
A group in the minute sample consists of 2.55 auctions while a group in the daily sample 
consists of 2.77 auctions.  While this may seem surprising, a careful look at the data shows 
that there are many groups with only two auctions, and sellers set the ending time many 
minutes or even hours apart. These auction groups appear in the daily (or hourly) sample, but 
not in the minute sample, which causes the number of auctions in a group in the daily sample 
to be similar in size to the number in the minute sample. Table 1 also shows the average 
number of bidders and the number of bids submitted in the different groups. 
It should be noted that bidders may need to buy more than one unit for personal use or 
alternatively, they may be professional dealers.  The optimal strategies are likely to be 
different depending on whether bidders have single or multiple demands, with bidders 
requiring multiple units bidding across more than one auction at the same time.  The 
                                                 
12 Drawing the sample in this way means that we cannot examine competition among competing sellers.  That 
remains a topic for future research.  
13 Since a bidder responding in the last minute of the auction is more likely using special software or is a 
professional bidder, one minute cutoff might isolate professional bidders. We have also tried samples including 
groups of competing auctions ending within 5 minutes, half an hour, and 12 hours. The results are similar to the 
results obtained from minute, hourly and daily sample reported here.      
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existence of bidders demanding multiple units in our sample would bias our claim about 
cross-bidding.  Because we know bidder identities, we are able to address this problem, 
distinguishing genuine cross-bidders from bidders demanding multiple units in the next 
section.  
 
---- Insert Figure 1 about here ----- 
One might be concerned that bidders, especially novices, do not fully understand the 
auction mechanism used on eBay and may therefore experiment with different strategies.  In 
this paper, we use the feedback values as a rough indicator of traders’ experience on eBay.
14  
eBay also uses the feedback values in daily trading.  For example, to use the “Buy It Now” 
feature, sellers must have a feedback value greater than 10, otherwise they have to go through 
a process of identity verification in eBay, at a cost of $5.
15  Figure 2 shows the distribution of 
the bidders’ feedback values.  The daily sample includes 7,149 different bidders: among them, 
only 8 bidders had a negative feedback value,
16 accounting for 0.1% of all bidders, and 
bidders with feedback value 0 account for 10% of all bidders.  The feedback value of the 
remaining 90 percent of bidders was positive, while the feedback value of 60 percent of 
bidders was greater than 8, suggesting that they tend to have a history of successful 
transactions on eBay.   
 
4  Bidding Behavior in Competing Auctions 
Using these data on detailed individual bidding history from eBay, in this section, we 
study detailed bidding behavior by examining the behavior of all bidders within each group 
of competing auctions.
17  In particular, we test whether bidders bid across competing auctions, 
and whether or not a bid is submitted on an auction with the lowest standing bid within the 
relevant auction group. 
                                                 
14 Before March 2003, eBay displayed a feedback summary value given by the number of positive feedbacks 
received from other unique users, minus the number of negatives. We use this value as an  indicator of 
experience because we did not collect data on neutral or negative feedback.  In fact, Resnick and Zeckhauser 
(2001) report that only 0.6% of the feedbacks left by buyers about sellers are negative or neutral. In March 2003, 
eBay began displaying the percentage of positive feedbacks along with the total score. 
15 See http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/bin.html. 
16 If a bidder has different feedback number during the period, we use the highest feedback number. 
17 Determining whether a bidder cross-bids and whether a bid is submitted to the auction with the lowest 
standing bid is not a trivial task.  It involves the comparison of auction prices at any point of time and the 
tracking of the whole bidding histories for all auctions in a competing auction group.  We used Java’s TreeSet 
data structure for this purpose.  See Bruce (2002, Chapter 9) for details. 
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Table 2 provides evidence on the first of these issues - whether or not bidders bid 
across competing auctions. Panel A reports the average number of bidders bidding across 
competing auctions and the proportion of such bidders in the relevant competing auctions 
group.  It does so on two separate bases: including and then excluding multiple unit demand 
bidders.  If we include multiple unit demand bidders in the calculation (the more liberal 
measure), the mean proportion of bidders who bid across auctions is positive in each case - 
19 percent in the daily sample, 31 percent in the hourly sample and 32 percent in the minute 
sample.  Further, the data clearly reject the null hypothesis that the proportion of bidders who 
cross-bid is zero, the t-statistics for the daily sample, hourly sample and minute sample being 
36.4, 35.4 and 20.0 respectively, with the corresponding one-tailed p-values all less than 
0.001.  
It is clear that the proportion of bidders who cross-bid is very similar for the minute 
sample and hourly sample, and that both proportions are significantly larger than the 
proportion in the daily sample.  In panel B of Table 2, we carry out a formal test to compare 
the proportion of bidders who cross-bid in the different samples.  The null that the proportion 
of cross-bidders in the daily and hourly samples are equal is easily rejected in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis that the proportion in the hourly sample in greater.  This finding is 
consistent with the notion that cross-bidding is more likely on auctions which are closer 
substitutes –  in this case, closer substitutes across time.   
One might wonder whether the cross-bidding observed here is due solely to the 
existence of bidders who want to acquire multiple units of the good.  Bidder intentions are 
not observable, but it can be argued that the bidders who are attempting to acquire multiple 
units are likely to bid aggressively on several auctions thereby increasing their chances of 
winning these auctions.  In contrast, a bidder seeking a single unit is likely to bid aggressively 
on only one auction at a time, thereby avoiding a situation in which he/she wins more than 
one auction.  Accordingly, such bidders will hesitate to become the highest bidders in more 
than one auction, especially towards the end of the auction.  Based on these considerations, 
we define ‘true’ cross-bidders to be those who (a) are never the winner of more than one 
auction and (b) are never the highest bidder in more than one auction on the last day of the 
auction.      
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Criterion (b) may cause a bias in specific cases. For example, if an auction ends 
before the last day of the auction, and a bidder bids aggressively to attempt to acquire 
multiple units, criterion (b) cannot be used to identify such a multiple unit bidder, and the 
bidder will be classified (incorrectly) as a ‘true’ cross-bidder. Fortunately, this case rarely 
occurs in eBay because of the prevalence of late bidding. In Figure 2, we provide a histogram 
of the bid submission times for all bids in the hourly sample, for illustration.  More than 40 
percent of the bids are submitted during the final 10 percent of the remaining auction time, 
consistent with the late bidding noted by Roth and Ockenfels (2003). 
----Insert Figure 2 about here----- 
 
Table 2 also reports cross-bidding results on a second basis, by excluding multiple 
unit demand bidders. Multiple unit demand bidders account for only a relatively small 
proportion of all cross-bidders - on average around 10 to 20 percent of all samples.  After 
excluding bidders who are attempting to acquire multiple units, we still observe a high 
percentage of bidders who cross-bid.  The mean proportion of bidders who cross-bid is 14 
percent in the daily sample, 20 percent in the hourly sample and 20 percent in the minute 
sample.  For the null hypothesis that the proportion of bidders who cross bid is 0, the t-
statistics for the daily sample, the hourly sample and the minute sample are 36.3, 32.0 and 
17.2 respectively, with the corresponding one-tailed p-values less than 0.001 in each case.  
For the comparison of the proportion of bidders who bid across competing auctions among 
three samples, the results are similar to the ones including the multiple unit demand bidders 
(see Panel B of Table 2); the proportion of bidders who bid across competing auctions is not 
significantly different between the hourly sample and the minute sample, while the 
proportion of cross-bidders is significantly smaller in the daily sample.  Again, this is 
consistent with the notion that cross-bidding is more likely on auctions that are closer 
substitutes across time.   
Another important implication of competing auctions theory is that bidders tend to bid 
on auctions where the standing bid is the lowest.  This strategy ensures that a bidder who is 
attempting to buy only a single unit of a commodity never wins more than one auction.  In 
addition, bidders avoid being trapped into paying excessively high prices.      
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In order to determine the proportion of bids submitted on auctions with the lowest 
standing bid, simply dividing the number of such bids by the total number of bids submitted 
is not appropriate.  To see this, if all auctions in a group have ended save one, then there will 
be no more competition and bids submitted to this remaining auction might be considered as 
bidding on the auction with the lowest standing bid.  However, this method will tend to over-
estimate the proportion of bids submitted to the auction with the lowest standing bid, 
especially for groups of auctions where the ending times of auctions are further apart, as with 
the daily sample.  In order to calculate the relevant proportion, we first isolate those bids 
submitted while at least one another competing auction was in progress. (The auction groups 
where the number of such bids is zero have been excluded from following calculations.)  
Among these bids, we calculate the proportion of bids that were submitted on auctions where 
the standing bid was the lowest, the results shown in Table 3. 
 
------Insert Table 3 about here ----- 
 
This table reports summary statistics on the number of bids submitted while at least 
one another competing auction was in progress, and the number of bids submitted on the 
auction with the lowest standing bid. The mean proportion of those bids submitted on the 
auction with the lowest standing bid is high –  62 percent for the daily sample, 72 percent for 
the hourly sample, and 76 percent for the minute sample.  We also observe significant 
variation in these proportions.  
It is worth noting that the mean proportion, reported in the third row of the table, is 
much higher than the ratio of the mean number of bids submitted on auctions with the lowest 
standing bid (reported in the second row) to the mean of the total bids (in the first row).  This 
difference can be accounted for by the existence of auction groups with a low total number of 
bids but a very high proportion of bids submitted on auctions with the lowest standing bid. 
The high proportions in Table 3 need to be placed in perspective.  If bidders were to 
choose an auction in a group randomly each time they placed a bid, our method of calculation 
would tend to generate proportions in the range 30 to 50 percent.
18  The results in Table 3 are 
much higher. For the null that the proportion is 50 percent, the t-statistics for the daily sample, 
                                                 
18 This is because there are at least two auctions in our calculation, and we know that the average number of 
auctions in a group is less than three in all three samples.  Thanks to a referee for making this point.      
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hourly sample and minute sample are 17.6, 28.8 and 21.4 respectively, rejecting the 
hypothesis of random bidding in favor of bidding on the auction with the lowest standing bid. 
We might expect an increased tendency to bid on a competing auction with the lowest 
standing bid when the auctions in an auction group compete more closely. We do observe a 
slight monotonic tendency, especially comparing the hourly data and daily data.  However, 
this may simply be due to the fact that groups of auctions that compete more closely are 
smaller in size, so even when bidders submit bids randomly, a monotonic tendency may still 
be apparent.  Further research into this lack of monotonicity may be fruitful. 
 
5        Do Cross-Bidders Pay Lower Prices? 
Bidding across competing auctions affords bidders greater choice.  More importantly, 
cross-bidding allows bidders to switch to auctions where the standing bid is low, and as the 
theory of competing auctions predicts, cross-bidding should result in bidders paying lower 
prices in competing auctions. 
In order to test the above prediction, we divide each group of competing auctions into 
two subgroups: a group consisting of auctions in which the winner of the auction is a true 
cross-bidder, as defined in Section 4, and a group consisting of the remainder of the auctions. 
We calculate the mean price paid by the winners in each subgroup and the ratio of these two 
average prices.  In some groups, all winners were ‘true’ cross bidder while in others, none of 
the winners were –  both these types of groups are excluded from the analysis.  We therefore 
consider only those groups in which there are a mixture of winners  - those who are true 
cross-bidders and winners who are not, allowing us to focus on those auctions that involve 
both types of winner and so make a meaningful comparison of prices paid.  The results are 
summarized in Table 4. 
 
----Insert Table 4 about here ----  
 
Within the minute sample, only 77 groups of competing auctions include winners who 
bid across competing auctions and winners who do not.  The ratio of the average price paid 
by cross-bidders to the average price paid by non-cross bidders is 0.91, with a standard 
deviation of 0.17.  This indicates that there is a 9 percent discount for those winning bidders      
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who cross-bid. For an average price of around 60 dollars in the sample, the saving is not 
trivial. 
The table also reports a test of the null hypothesis that the ratio of the two population 
means is equal to 1 against the alternative that the ratio is less than 1.  Winners who bid 
across competing auctions on average pay a lower price as compared to those who do not, the 
difference being statistically significant –  the relevant t-statistic has a value of -4.64. 
The hourly sample is larger, including 244 groups of competing auctions with winners 
who bid across competing auctions and winners who do not.  The ratio of the average price 
paid by cross bidders and non-cross bidders is 0.93, with a standard deviation of 0.27.  Within 
the daily sample, there are 394 groups of competing auctions with winners who bid across 
competing auctions and winners who do not. The ratio of the average price paid by cross 
bidders and by non-cross bidders is 0.94 with a standard deviation of 0.18. Hypothesis tests 
show the ratio is significantly different from 1 in both samples. For the null hypothesis that 
the ratio of the two population means is equal to 1 against the alternative that the ratio is less 
than 1, the t-statistic is -4.05 for hourly sample and -6.62 for daily sample.. 
This evidence indicates that bidders who cross-bid on competing auctions are strictly 
better off.  It is also interesting to note that the reward from cross-bidding appears to increase 
as the ending times of the auctions in a competing group become closer, though a formal 
hypothesis test shows that the differences are not statistically significant.  This increasing 
gain can be attributed to the fact that it is easier to coordinate bidding on competing auctions 
if these auctions end at approximately the same time. 
  
6  Conclusion 
Most existing studies assume that all auctions, including on-line auctions, are 
independent.  This paper provides the first related pieces of evidence that lend support to 
competing auctions theory.  Our analysis of eBay data shows that bidders’ behavior is very 
different in the presence of competing auctions.  Specifically, bidders tend to bid across 
competing auctions and bid on the auction with the lowest standing bid.  Our investigation 
shows that a greater proportion of bidders cross-bid if competing auctions end at 
approximately the same time.  We also find that winners who bid across competing auctions 
tend to pay lower price than those who do not.      
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The theory of competing auctions proposed by Peters and Severinov (2002) suggests 
that, as a result of cross bidding, the final price paid by winning bidders is likely to be 
uniform.  This remains the subject of future research.  In addition, the current paper takes the 
behavior of sellers as exogenous, focusing on bidding behavior in competing auctions.  We 
plan to investigate the behavior of sellers in a separate paper. 
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Appendix 1. A bidding History Page from eBay 
 
EBay Bid History for 
Intel Pentium II Xeon 450MHz 512k - Used (Item # 1292121814)  
 Currently  $24.49   First 
bid   $10.00 
 Quantity   1   # of 
bids  
10 
 Time left  Auction has ended.  
 Started   Oct-31-01 22:51:27 PST 
 Ends   Nov-03-01 22:51:27 PST 
 Seller 
(Rating)   nhahmad (11)   
 
View page with email addresses (Accessible by 
Seller only)   Learn more.  
Bidding History (Highest bids first)  
User ID   Bid Amount   Date of Bid  
planetorb (9)  $24.49  Nov-03-01 22:30:37 PST 
ibgeek (4)  $23.99  Nov-03-01 22:18:01 PST 
raheem112 (0)  $21.00  Nov-03-01 22:03:35 PST 
iteachcomputers (1)    $20.00  Nov-03-01 22:06:49 PST 
raheem112 (0)  $20.00  Nov-03-01 18:33:27 PST 
planetorb (9)  $17.50  Nov-01-01 21:11:05 PST 
raheem112 (0)  $15.00  Nov-03-01 18:33:16 PST 
raheem112 (0)  $14.00  Nov-03-01 18:32:50 PST 
raheem112 (0)  $13.00  Nov-03-01 18:32:39 PST 
raheem112 (0)  $11.00  Nov-03-01 18:31:52 PST 
Remember that earlier bids of the same amount take precedence.  
Bid Retraction and Cancellation History  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics on the Three Competing Auctions Sub-Samples  
 
  Daily sample  Hourly sample  Minute sample 
Number of groups of competing auctions  1943  1021  328 
Average number of auctions in each group of  
competing auctions* 
2.77  2.63  2.55 
Average number of bidders in each group  10.74  9.30  7.72 
Average number of bids submitted to each 
group 
22.18  20.58  16.13 
 
*As defined in the text, a ‘group of competing auctions’ consists of auctions involving the sale the same CPU, 
sold by the same seller, and all ending within a given interval of each other (one day, one hour or one minute).        
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Table 2.  Evidence on Cross-Bidding Behavior 
  
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
  Daily sample  Hourly sample  Minute sample 




































Panel B: Hypothesis tests for equality in the proportion of cross bidders comparing different 
samples 
  
  Including multi-unit bidders 
Excluding multi-unit 
bidders 
Equality between daily sample and 














Equality between the hourly sample 















Note: The t-values correspond to a test of the null hypothesis that the proportion of bidders who cross bid is 
equal between the daily and the hourly sample, and between the hourly and the minute sample, respectively.  P-
values are based on a two-tailed test.       
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Table 3. Proportion of Bids Submitted to Auctions with the Lowest Standing Bid 
 
 
   Minute sample  Hourly sample  Daily sample 
       
Number of bids (while at least one another competing 







Number of bids submitted to the auction with lowest 







Proportion of bids submitted to the auction with the lowest 











Auction groups on which no bids were submitted (while at least one competing auction was in progress) were 
excluded for the above calculations. 
 
The value of t-statistic concerning the null hypothesis that the proportion of bids submitted to auctions with the 
lowest standing bid is equal across the minute and the hourly sample is 1.33.  
 
The value of t-statistic concerning the null hypothesis that the proportion of bids submitted to auctions with the 
lowest standing bid is equal across the hourly and the daily sample is 5.01.  
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Table 4. Hypothesis Tests Comparing the Ratio of Price Paid by Cross-Bidding 
Winners and Non-Cross-Bidding Winners 
 
 
  Mean  Standard deviation  t-statistic  p-value 
Daily sample (N =394)  0.94  0.18  -6.62  <0.000 
Hourly sample (N=244)  0.93  0.27  -4.05  <0.000 
Minute sample (N =77)  0.91  0.17  -4.64  <0.000 
 
Note: ‘Mean’ and ‘Standard deviation’ denote the mean and standard deviation of the ratio of the price paid by 
cross-bidding winners and non-cross-bidding winners.  We also report the corresponding one-tailed p-value.  Ho: 
the ratio of price paid by cross-bidding winner and by non-cross-bidding winner is equal to 1, Ha: the ratio is 
less than 1.  
 
 